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Doesn’t Look Like Anything to Me: Protecting
Wetlands by Narrowing the Definition of “Waters of
the United States”
INTRODUCTION
A farmer sets out to stake his claim to the American Dream. Like his
father and generations before, the farmer desires only to make an honest
living. The farmer purchases a vast tract of land in Northern California
with plans to grow wheat on the property. The farmer plows the field and
plants the wheat. Satisfied with his work, the farmer sits back and waits
for the crops to grow. A few weeks before the harvest, two Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) agents arrive at the farmer’s fields. The agents
claim that by plowing his fields the farmer has violated the Clean Water
Act’s (CWA) provision protecting the “waters of the United States.” The
farmer is confused. He doesn’t understand how the CWA is violated if the
only water in the fields comes from the irrigation system he installed.
The agents inform him that the field constitutes a wetland and that he
failed to acquire the requisite permit to plow the field. The only wetlands
the farmer knows are those down in Louisiana where his favorite show
“Swamp Citizens” is filmed. The EPA fines the farmer various amounts
totaling over two million dollars. Believing there is a mistake, the farmer
challenges these fines in court. Unfortunately, the court finds that the
farmer did violate the Clean Water Act by dredging a “seasonal wetland.”1
The farmer reluctantly settles the case for one million dollars. Now, nearly
bankrupt, the farmer’s dream has turned into a nightmare.
This distressing hypothetical is based on an actual farmer’s encounter
with the EPA and the CWA’s nebulous “waters of the United States”
(WOTUS) definition.2 The ambiguous definition leaves both farmers and
legal scholars alike, questioning the scope of governmental regulations of
the CWA. Without a clear determination of what areas fall under the
purview of the CWA, the rights of property owners are at risk. The various
interpretations of the WOTUS provision causes the EPA, courts, and
property owners to struggle to determine the scope of the EPA’s regulatory
authority. The purpose behind the CWA and the definition of WOTUS
indicate that the intent of the drafters was the protection of water bodies
Copyright 2019, by BRANDON PANG.
1. “Seasonal wetlands” are areas that are dry for one or more seasons every
year or may only be wet periodically. What is a Wetland?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Oct. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/QZY9-T2G5.
2. See Alexis Garcia, How Obama’s EPA Nearly Bankrupted John Duarte’s
Farm, REASON.COM (Sept. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/7MGM-U5K4.
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from pollutants. However, the EPA and courts have expanded the
provision to include things that play a vital role in the ecology of the water
bodies, such as wetlands and tributaries.3 Wetlands are not always wet;
they may be wet seasonally or periodically. Under the CWA, there is no
clear way to determine what constitutes a wetland, leaving the scope of
federal regulation equally unclear.
There have been many controversial and unsuccessful attempts to
resolve this issue: the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)
interpreted the scope of the “waters of the United States;”4 the EPA, under
the Obama administration, promulgated the Clean Water Rule in 2015 in
an attempt to clarify the WOTUS definition; and the EPA, under the
Trump administration, proposed a new definition.5 The best solution to
dispel the confusion is for Congress to revisit and amend the CWA,
redefining WOTUS once and for all.
To help the reader fully understand how the definition of WOTUS
creates so many problems, Part I of this Comment surveys the statutory
history of the “waters of the United States.” Part II examines the
interpretation of “waters of the United States” by the Supreme Court. Part
III analyzes the EPA’s Clean Water Rule (CWR) promulgated in 2015 and
the ongoing battles in federal court with states and property owners
fighting its implementation. Part IV addresses the EPA’s newly proposed
rule to rescind the CWR and redefine WOTUS pursuant to President
Trump’s Executive Order. Part V concludes the best solution is for
Congress to amend the CWA by narrowing the definition of WOTUS to a
more commonsense understanding of the term “waters.” This more
permanent solution is necessary to put an end to the confusion and overregulation.
I. NAVIGATING THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
It was not until the mid-twentieth century, as a response to growing
public concern, that the United States government formally enacted
regulations to protect water sources from pollution.6 The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1948 was the first major federal law
to address water pollution.7 The Act sought to encourage water pollution
3. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: How Wetlands are Defined and
Identified, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/H59Z-VEAE.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See infra note 127.
6. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, History of the Clean Water Act (Sept. 16,
2017), https://perma.cc/W53W-F6SG.
7. Id.

2019]

COMMENT

225

control at the state level.8 Under the FWPCA, Congress had no authority
to establish water quality standards, limit discharges, or engage in
enforcement actions for interstate waters.9 It would take an additional three
decades for the federal government to take a more active role in the
protection of what would become the “waters of the United States.”10
Sweeping concerns over water pollution prompted a series of
amendments in 1972 to the FWPCA known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA).11 The CWA established a basic structure for regulating discharges
of pollutants into the “waters of the United States” and set quality
standards for surface waters.12 The current CWA generally prohibits the
discharge of any pollutant by any person into the WOTUS.13 Discharge
under the CWA refers to “any addition of any pollutant into ‘navigable
waters’ from any point source.”14 Pollution here refers to “the man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and
radiological integrity of water.”15 The CWA further provides a list of
pollutants discharged into water including: dredged spoil, solid waste,
sewage, garbage, chemical wastes, rock, sand, and agricultural waste.16
The CWA interprets the term “pollutants” broadly enough to even include
dirt. Thus, almost anything that involves moving dirt or depositing fill
materials for construction can constitute a discharge of pollutants into the
WOTUS.
The CWA gives federal regulators the authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations to protect America’s “navigable waters.”17 “Navigable
waters,” defined as “waters of the United States,” include the territorial
seas.18 The CWA does not, however, identify which water bodies fall
under the umbrella of “waters of the United States.” In 1974, in an attempt
to provide guidance, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
interpreted “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States which are
8. Kayla A. Currie, Clear Waters Ahead? The Clean Water Rule Attempts
To Bring Clarity To The Scope Of The Clean Water Act, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 191,
198 (2017).
9. Id.
10. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Summary of the Clean Water Act (Sept. 16,
2017), https://perma.cc/K52Z-8GEQ.
13. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012).
14. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
15. Id. at § 1362(19).
16. Id. at § 1362(6).
17. Id. at § 1362(7).
18. Id.
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subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and presently, or have been in the
past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate
or foreign commerce.”19 Over the course of the next eight years, the Corps
further expanded the definition to include adjacent wetlands and
tributaries of navigable and interstate waters.20 While the expansion of
federal regulation to tributaries that feed into “waters of the United States”
is a reasonable step in furtherance of the Clean Water Act, the inclusion of
wetlands in this expanded definition requires a greater logical leap and
raises some concern.
A. What’s a Wetland Good For? Absolutely Nothing!
Determining whether a wetland falls into the category of WOTUS is
a fundamental problem for identifying what constitutes a wetland. The
presence of hydric soils and hydrophytes sometimes acts as an
identification of wetlands.21 It is often difficult to determine from outward
appearance whether a piece of land is classified as a wetland. For example,
despite their classification as wetlands, the Florida Everglades and
Mississippi bottomland hardwood swamps are often dry.22 This is because
“the amount of water present in wetlands fluctuates as a result of rainfall
patterns, snow melt, dry seasons, and long droughts.”23 The Corps and the
EPA define wetlands for regulatory purposes as follows:
Wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs,
and similar areas.24

19. Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974).
20. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 1234 (1985) (recounting the expansion of the Corp’s interpretation).
21. “The upper part of the soil is saturated with water at growing season
temperatures, soil organisms consume the oxygen in the soil and cause conditions
unsuitable for most plants. Such conditions also cause the development of soil
characteristics (such as color and texture) of so-called 'hydric soils'. The plants
that can grow in such conditions, such as marsh grasses, are called ‘hydrophytes.’"
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(4).
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Though humid and muddy, wetlands are a vital component of the aquatic
ecosystem.25 This key component to various environmental processes is
disappearing at an alarming rate due to natural disasters, storms, and
human intervention.26 Between the 1950’s and 1970’s, an average of
458,000 acres of the United States’ wetlands disappeared each year.27
Louisiana’s three million acres of wetlands are disappearing at the rate of
about seventy-five square kilometers annually.28 The significance of the
wetlands’ role in the environment, coupled with rapid disappearance of
these lands, led to increased regulation and protection. The rapid loss of
wetlands is a cause for concern, but it should not be used as a pretense to
expand federal regulations of land under the CWA.
B. Section 404 Permitting Process: A License to Fill
Section 404 of the CWA gives the Corps the authority to grant permits
for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into the navigable waters.29
Failure to comply with the permit process’s conditions and limitations can
result in civil and criminal liability.30 The common applicants for these
permits are individual property owners and businesses. The Corps issues
jurisdictional determinations on whether a body of water will be regulated
under the CWA by performing a jurisdictional delineation of waters on a
property.31 The Corps performs jurisdictional delineations on a property to
determine which waters are classified as WOTUS.32 The Corps uses the
1987 Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation Manual and ten regional
supplements to conduct wetland delineation.33 The manual organizes
characteristics of potential wetlands into three categories: hydric soils,
hydrophytic vegetation, and hydrology.34 During a wetland delineation,
25. See Joseph G. Theis, Wetlands Loss and Agriculture: The Failed Federal
Regulation of Farming Activities Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 9
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1,2 (1991).
26. Threats to Wetlands, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE,
https://perma.cc/NK86-4NBW (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
27. See EPA’S Report on The Environment: Wetland Extent, Change, and
Sources of Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/67VG-7XL3 (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017).
28. Jefferess Williams, Louisiana Costal Wetlands: A Resource At Risk,
U.S.G.S., https://perma.cc/4GMS-35Y9 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c).
31. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the Corps surveys a project area to determine whether the three
characteristics are present.35 An area that possesses the three above
characteristics is a wetland and thus subject to Section 404’s permit
process.
Section 404’s permit program raises a specific point of controversy
regarding federal wetland regulation.36 Critics of the permit program call
it an “unprecedented federal presence in land use regulation,” while
defenders see it as “the most effective means of preserving wetlands.”37
Landowners and businesses that oppose the permit requirements claim the
process is time-consuming and financially burdensome. A study
highlighting the cost and delays for a Section 404 permit found the average
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 to
complete the process, with the average applicant for a nationwide permit
spending 313 days and $28,915.38
The broad scope of pollutants and the uncertainty of which areas of
land constitute “waters” under the CWA make it difficult for property
owners to determine when a permit is required before altering their
property. In Sackett v. EPA, the EPA threatened a couple with a $75,000
per day fine for placing gravel on essentially dry land to build a home in a
subdivision.39 The Sacketts owned a property north of Priest Lake, but
separated from the lake by several lots containing permanent structures.40
The Sacketts filled in part of their lot with dirt and rock in preparation for
constructing a house.41 The EPA sent a compliance order asserting the
following: (1) the Sackett’s property was subject to the CWA, (2) the act
of placing fill material on the property was a violation, and (3) an EPA
work plan required the Sacketts to immediately restore the property.42 The
compliance order asserted that the Sacketts’ lot was an adjacent wetland
to a “navigable water,” i.e. Priest Lake.43 This case highlights how broad
interpretations of WOTUS and pollutants can make an act, such as laying
35. Id.
36. Michael C. Blumm and D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection
Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental
Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 698 (1989).
37. Id.
38. Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule:
It’s a Power Grab and an Attack on Property Rights, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/ATK5-S8RH.
39. Id.
40. Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 124 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 124.
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a foundation on perceivably dry land to build a home, a discharge of
pollutants into WOTUS.
II. SCOTUS TAKES A SWING AT WOTUS
The Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States” expanded
during the eight years after it issued initial guidance in 1974.44 These
expansive interpretations ultimately led to challenges in federal court. The
Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) reviewed the scope of
“navigable waters” under the CWA’s Section 404 permitting program.
SCOTUS interpreted the scope of the “navigable waters” definition in
three landmark cases: United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
(Riverside); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC); and Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos).
In this trilogy of cases, SCOTUS addressed the scope of the Corps’ power
to assert regulatory authority over wetlands. Each opinion illustrates the
Court’s struggle to define the scope of the ambiguous phrase “waters of
the United States.”
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
In 1985, the Corps filed suit against Riverside Bayview, Inc. seeking
an injunction to prevent further filling of low-lying marshlands without a
permit.45 The Corps believed the marshlands to be “adjacent wetland”
subject to the federal regulation.46 The marshland in dispute was “adjacent
to but not connected to Lake St. Clair, a navigable water.”47 The district
court found the marshlands constituted a wetland and granted an
injunction to prevent filling without a permit.48 The Sixth Circuit
disagreed, construing the Corps’ regulations to exclude from the category
of “adjacent wetlands” those wetlands that were not subject to flooding by
adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth
aquatic vegetation.49
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court deferred to the Corps’
ecological judgment that adjacent wetlands “in reasonable proximity to
other waters of the United States” are “inseparably bound up” with the
waters to which they are adjacent, and the Court further upheld the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
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inclusion of “adjacent wetlands” in the regulatory definition of “waters of
the United States.”50 The Court conceded that “it may appear unreasonable
to classify lands, wet or otherwise as waters;”51 however, where on the
continuum to find the limit of “waters” was far from obvious, the
classification was appropriate.52 The Court gave deference to the Army
Corps of Engineers’ interpretation, finding that Congress’ concern for
protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to
regulate wetlands.53 The Court did not address whether “wetlands that are
not adjacent to bodies of open water” fall within the jurisdiction of the
CWA, a holding resulting in the expansion of the Corps’ jurisdiction over
WOTUS to “adjacent wetlands.”
B. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
In SWANCC (2001), the Supreme Court addressed whether “isolated
waters” fell within the jurisdiction of the CWA. The Solid Waste Agency
sought to utilize an abandoned mining site as a solid waste disposal site
and contacted the Corps to determine the necessity of a permit.54 The
Corps originally concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the site due to the
lack of “wetlands,” or areas which support “vegetation typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions.”55 The Corps then reversed its position
and asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the “Migratory Bird Rule.”56 The
Corps believed that filling the pits would disturb 121 migratory bird
species that depended on the seasonal ponds created by the abandoned
gravel pits.57
SCOTUS rejected the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, holding that the
use of “isolated,” non-navigable intrastate ponds by migratory birds did
not provide a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal regulatory
authority under the CWA.58 The majority held that the Corps exceeded its
authority, finding that a “significant nexus” between the wetlands at issue
50. Id. at 134.
51. Id. at 132.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 134.
54. Id. at 131, n.8; Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
55. Id. at 164.
56. The Migratory Bird Rule extended jurisdiction over interstate waters
“which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines.” Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 167.
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and the adjacent “navigable waters” is required to invoke jurisdiction
under Section 404 of the CWA.59 The Court distinguished this case from
Riverside because the gravel pits here remained isolated from, and not
adjacent to, navigable waters.60 The Court concluded that the Corps’
assertion of jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats would result in a
“significant impingement of the state’s traditional and primary power over
land and water use.”61 The Supreme Court’s holding restricted the Corps’
expansive exercise of jurisdiction but left many questions unanswered.
The scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction was still unclear after the ruling
in SWANCC. Riverside held that “adjacent wetlands” fell under the
CWA’s jurisdiction, while SWANCC held that “isolated waters” did not.
As a result of this uncertainty, the circuit split on the extent of the
regulatory authority the Corps had over wetlands near non-navigable
tributaries that flowed into navigable rivers and non-adjacent wetlands.62
C. Rapanos v. United States
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Rapanos (2006) resulted
in a plurality opinion which does not provide much guidance.63 The Court
consolidated two cases64 concerning land not adjacent to “navigable
waters” but adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that flowed into
“navigable waters.”65 The Court considered whether the wetlands near
ditches or man-made drains that eventually emptied into traditional
navigable waters constituted "waters of the United States" under the
CWA.66 The Solicitor General argued that broad deference should be
given to the Corps’ interpretation.67 The plurality rejected this argument
and sought to rein in the government’s interpretation, ultimately
remanding the case without reaching a consensus.68

59. Id.
60. Id. at 168.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos - Will Justice Kennedy's
Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts,
Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 291-92 (2007).
63. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, (2006).
64. The two consolidated cases are: Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers; and United States v. Rapanos.
65. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 729.
66. Id.
67. Currie, supra note 8, at 208.
68. Id.
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Justices Scalia and Kennedy disagreed over the scope of the
jurisdiction under the CWA.69 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality (41-4), held the CWA’s phrase "waters of the United States" included “only
relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water
‘forming geographic features’ described in ordinary parlance as streams,
oceans, rivers, and lakes.”70 Scalia stated that “these terms connote
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry
channels through which water occasionally of intermittently flows.”71 The
phrase did not include intermittent or ephemeral channels or channels that
periodically provided drainage for rainfall.72 Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the “waters of the United States” definition should not be limited to
the traditional “navigable in fact” standard.73 Scalia’s opinion narrowed
the scope of the CWA by shifting the focus of interpretation to the term
“water” rather than the qualifiers “navigable” and “of the United States.”74
Under Scalia’s approach, the CWA encompasses only those wetlands that
possess a continuous surface connection with “waters of the United States”
in their own right.75
Justice Kennedy concurred, concluding that the appropriate test for the
scope of jurisdictional waters is whether a water or wetland possessed a
“‘significant nexus’76 to the waters that are or were navigable in fact or
that could reasonably be so made.”77 Kennedy suggests wetlands that
affect covered waters deemed “navigable” are subject to federal
regulation.78 Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test does not specify
how much impact a wetland must have on a “navigable water” to
significantly affect the water quality; however, Justice Kennedy did note
that adjacency to a non-navigable tributary alone is insufficient to assert
69. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
70. Id. at 732.
71. Id. at 732-33.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 731-32.
74. Id. at 731.
75. Id. at 742.
76. Justice Kennedy explained that “Wetlands possess the requisite nexus,
and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands,
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ When, in contrast,
wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside
the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’” Id. at 780.
77. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id.
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jurisdiction.79 Justice Kennedy suggested the Corps proceed on a case-bycase basis when regulating wetlands based on adjacency to non-navigable
tributaries.80 Furthermore, the Corps may presume covered status for
similarly situated wetlands in the region.81 Absent a definite standard to
help determine how much of an effect a wetland must have on a water
quality, Justice Kennedy’s analysis fails to provide clarity.
The difference between Justice Scalia’s opinion and Justice Kennedy’s
opinion stems largely from statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s
approach is based in textualism, while Justice Kennedy looks to the
legislative purpose of the CWA. Justice Scalia’s standard restricts waters to
encompass those that accord with the commonsense understanding of the
term “waters.” Justice Scalia further requires a “continuous connection”
between the “waters” and wetlands. In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s standard
focuses on the wetlands’ ecological impact on the waters. Both standards
accept that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters fall within the purview of
the CWA, but disagree when adjacent non-navigable tributaries only flow
into navigable waters. The four dissenters argued that the term “waters of
the United States” encompasses all tributaries and wetlands that satisfy
either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
standard.82 The dissension soon spilled over into lower courts.
The circuits quickly split over which Justice’s analysis to apply.83 The
First, Third, and Eighth Circuits concluded that CWA jurisdiction exists if
the government can satisfy either Justice Kennedy’s concurrence or Justice
Scalia’s test.84 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied Justice Kennedy’s
standard to the facts of particular cases, but did not foreclose the possibility
that in some cases, Justice Scalia’s test might apply instead.85 The Fifth
and Sixth Circuits declined to choose between the Scalia and Kennedy
tests because the waters at issue in the cases before them qualified under
both standards.86 With the circuits split and an outcry urging the
promulgation of a new rule, the EPA proposed a new Clean Water Rule in
2015 to remedy the confusion.

79. Id. at 786.
80. Id. at 782.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 810.
83. Currie, supra note 8, at 210.
84. Paul Larkin, The “Waters of the United States” Rule and the Void-forVagueness Doctrine, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 21, 2017), https://perma.cc
/ULH2-B9XN (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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III. THE CLEAN WATER RULE MUDDIES THE WATERS
The Obama Administration introduced the Clean Water Rule (CWR)
in 2015.87 The purpose of this rule was to clarify which waters constitute
“navigable waters.”88 The CWR aimed to precisely and predictably
determine the jurisdictional reach of the CWA.89 The intent was to ground
the new rule in law and science, shaped by public input.90 The CWR
maintained the old definition of “navigable waters” as “waters of the
United States” and the territorial seas but also accounted for past Supreme
Court rulings, public comment, and the EPA’s 2015 Connectivity of
Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Water Assessment.91 Notably, the
CWR sought to clarify which types of waters are covered categorically,
covered on a case-by-case basis, or not covered at all.92 The CWR
identifies the following six categories of waters that as per se
jurisdictional: (1) traditional navigable waters, (2) interstate waters, (3)
territorial seas, (4) impoundments of jurisdictional waters, (5) tributaries,
and (6) adjacent waters.93 The CWR also lists two categories of waters of
which jurisdiction is determined on a case-specific basis applying the
“significant nexus” standard.94
The CWR expands the phrase “waters of the United States” to include
streams and wetlands that significantly impact “downstream water quality
87. Rebecca Long, What You Need To Know About The Clean Water Rule,
AMERICAN RIVERS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/MW45-JASV (last visited
Sept. 16, 2017).
88. Id.
89. Clean Water Rule: Definitions of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 124, 37054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328).
90. Id.
91. Long, supra note 87. (The Connectivity of Stream and Wetlands to
Downstream Water Assessment’s purpose was to summarize the current
understandings about the connectivity and mechanisms by which streams and
wetlands affect the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of downstream
waters.) ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to
Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of Scientific Evidence (Final
Report) (Jan. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/Q9BM-533D.
92. Reagan Waskom and David Cooper, Why Farmers and Ranchers Think
the EPA Clean Water Rule goes too far, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/J7RB-SB4X.
93. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)-(6) (2015).
94. Id. at § 328.3(a)(7), (8). (Section 7 covers (i) Prairie potholes, (ii)
Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, (iii) Pocosins, (iv) Western Vernal Pools, (v)
Texas costal prairie wetlands. Section 8 covers all water located within 100-year
floodplain).
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and form the foundation of our nation’s water resources.”95 In addition to
the CWR’s attempt to clarify WOTUS, the new rule incorporated the
“significant nexus” analysis of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Rapanos.96 In determining the existence of a “significant nexus,” the EPA
shall assess the waters by evaluating their aquatic functions.97 A water has
a significant nexus when any single function or combination of functions
performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated waters in
the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological
integrity of the nearest water.98
The CWR immediately came under fire by critics because the addition
of the “significant nexus” analysis created a catch-all provision that
extended regulation to land that does not fall within the six categories of
the CWR’s WOTUS definition.99 Waters that do not fit within one of the
categories and do not qualify as a “neighboring” water are subject to a
“significant nexus” analysis under the CWR.100 The CWR’s inclusion of
the catch-all provision goes beyond the scope of Justice Kennedy’s
significant nexus test and allows the government even more regulatory
authority over private lands.
When the EPA promulgated the CWR in August 2015, various
challenges emerged immediately, including thirty-one states that filed suit
to stay the rule.101 Both chambers of Congress sought to overturn the CWR
by invoking the Congressional Review Act102 but failed to receive the
requisite majority to overcome President Obama’s veto power.103
Challengers claim that the EPA will use this rule to micromanage private

95. Id.
96. Id. at § 328.3(c)(5).
97. See id. at § 328.3(c)(5)(i)-(ix). The functions relevant to the significant
nexus evaluations are the following: (i) Sediment trapping, (ii) Nutrient recycling,
(iii) Pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport, (iv) Retention and
attenuation of flood waters, (v) Runoff storage, (vi) Contribution of flow, (vii)
Export of organic matter, (viii) Export of food resources, and (ix) Provision of life
cycle dependent aquatic habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding,
spawning, or use as a nursery area) for species located in a water identified in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
98. Id. at § 328.3(c)(5).
99. See Currie, supra note 8, at 217.
100. Id.
101. Long, supra note 89.
102. The Congressional Review Act allows Congress to pass a law within sixty
days to invalidate an agency’s rule; however, this law is subject to the president’s
veto power. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 801.
103. Currie, supra note 8, at 192.
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land use.104 These challengers, many of which are private landowners,
believe the CWR’s overreach will result in increased costs and more
hurdles to jump through for property owners and states to utilize their
lands.105 On August 27, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of
North Dakota enjoined the applicability of the CWR in the thirteen states
challenging the rule before that court.106 Soon after the Sixth Circuit stayed
the CWR nationwide, leaving the pre-rule regime to govern while the
CWR is under review.107 On January 13, 2017, SCOTUS granted certiorari
on the question of whether the Sixth Circuit has original jurisdiction to
review challenges to the CWR.108 One year later, on January 22, 2018, the
Supreme Court held that the courts of appeal do not have original
jurisdiction to review challenges to the 2015 rule.109 It is important to note
that the Supreme Court was not deciding the validity of the CWR, but only
whether the district courts or courts of appeal had jurisdiction over
challenges to the CWR. The challengers, which included industry and
environmental groups and eighteen states, preferred to have the merits of
their arguments heard first at the district court level.110
The challengers argue that the CWR is arbitrary and capricious
because the agency did not adequately provide notice and comment
rulemaking111 and the final rule substantially varies from the proposed
rule.112 Specifically, they contend that there is no record of scientific
support for the distance limitations in the final rule.113 The scientific report
drafted by the Scientific Advisory Board was not released until after the
104. Garcia, supra note 2.
105. Timothy Benson, Sixth Circuit Provides Bridge over Troubled WOTUS,
THE HILL (Oct. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/T77B-MJDS.
106. Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Addition of an Applicability
Date 50 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 25 (Feb. 6, 2018); see also North
Dakota v. United States EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1051 (D.N.D. 2015).
107. Definition of “Waters of the United States” - Recodification of PreExisting Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328).
108. Id.
109. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
110. Christopher D. Thomas, Judicial challenges to the Clean Water Rule: A
brief and relatively painless guide for the procrastinator, TRENDS Vol. 47 No. 4,
https://perma.cc/R4KT-25N6.
111. In order for an agency to promulgate a rule or make a change to an
existing rule, the agency must comply with the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act requirements for rulemaking codified in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
112. See complaint at 35, Georgia v. McCarthy, No. CV 215-79, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114040 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2015).
113. Currie, supra note 8, at 215.
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new rule was published, failing to allow for any comment on the
findings.114 The challengers of the rule argue that the final rule is not a
product of reasoned decision-making and is impermissibly arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).115 The APA
provides that “[a] reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”116
Many states challenged the rule on the grounds that the EPA usurped
states’ authority over land management.117 The CWA provides that “it is
the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use of land and water resources.”118
Under the CWA, states provide an important role in the administration of
the CWA because they have a better sense of their specific environmental
needs than the federal government and can tailor regulation to their
needs.119
Challengers also argue the rule is too broad and the result is an
unnecessary overreach that threatens private farm owners’ land.120 Despite
the EPA’s assurances, landowners worry the CWR might include
agricultural ditches, canals, and drainages in the definition of “tributary.”121
The CWR defines tributary for the first time as water that contributes flow,
whether directly or indirectly, into a WOTUS.122 The definition goes on to
state that tributaries can be natural or man-made.123 With the expansive
scope of the current CWA jurisdiction already causing problems for
landowners, the CWR makes private landowners nervous.
IV.

POTUS SHAKES UP WOTUS

On June 27, 2017, the EPA, under the Trump administration
announced a roll back on the Obama-era policy’s protection of more than
114. Bakst, supra note 38.
115. Currie, supra note 8, at 215.
116. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
117. Currie, supra note 8, at 220.
118. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012).
119. Id. at § 1251(g); Bakst, supra note 38.
120. Reagan Waskom and David J. Cooper, Why farmers and ranchers think
the EPA Clean Water Rule goes too far, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/QRB3-E7UB.
121. Currie, supra note 8, at 222.
122. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(3).
123. Id.
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half the nation’s streams.124 Former EPA Chief Scott Pruitt125 aimed to
return the agency to their core focus of protecting the environment while
following “the letter of the law.”126 The EPA decided to take a new
direction after President Trump’s Executive Order 13778: “Restoring the
Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth By Reviewing the
‘waters of the United States’ Rule.”127 The Executive Order directed the
EPA and the Corps to rescind the 2015 CWR and propose a new rule that
is “appropriate and consistent with the law.”128
The first section of the Executive Order addressed the need to protect
the Nation’s waters from pollutants, while also highlighting the
importance of not burdening economy through regulatory uncertainty in
the process.129 Section two stated that executive agencies have the
authority to rescind and revise the regulatory definition of “waters of the
United States,” consistent with the policy guidance in the Executive Order,
so long as the revised definition remained “authorized under the law and
based on a reasoned explanation.”130 Section three of the Executive Order
also directed the agencies to consider interpreting the term “navigable
waters” in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Rapanos.131 This section recommended that the EPA narrow the
interpretive scope of the term “navigable waters.”132
The Executive Order called for the rescission of a rule that is not
currently in effect nationwide. The EPA, under the Obama administration,
promulgated the CWR in 2015, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its effect. To
carry out the goals of the Executive Order, the EPA will first have to
propose a rule to rescind the CWR (“Proposed Rule”), before it can
promulgate a rule to redefine the definition of “navigable waters” (“New
Rule”). To do this, the EPA will have to conduct formal rulemaking in

124. Long, supra note 88.
125. Scott Pruitt resigned on July 5, 2018, in the face of numerous ethics
investigations. See Coral Davenport, Lisa Friedman, and Maggie Haberman,
E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics Scandals, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/UN3Y-LEW7.
126. Garcia, supra note 2.
127. See Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (2017).
128. Definition of “Waters of the United States” - Recodification of PreExisting Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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accordance with the APA.133 If the agency ultimately decides to
promulgate a rule, then it must issue a concise general statement that
articulates the basis for the rule and respond to the comments it has
received.134 The Proposed Rule, rescinding the CWR, establishes a clear
regulatory framework that avoids the inconsistency, uncertainty, and
confusion that would result if the Sixth Circuit lifted the stay and the CWR
went into effect.135 This Proposed Rule is intended to ensure that during
this interim period between the rescission of the CWR and the
promulgation of the New Rule, the status quo will be maintained, thus
providing continuity and regulatory certainty for regulated entities, States,
Tribes, and the public.136 If the EPA successfully rescinds the CWR, the
EPA will have to once again engage in the rulemaking process to redefine
“navigable waters” as part of its plan to promulgate the New Rule.
In November of 2017, the EPA and the Corps proposed another rule
(“Suspension Rule”) adding an applicability date to the 2015 CWR two
years from the final action on this proposal.137 The most likely reason for
the EPA’s Suspension Rule was to maintain the status quo in the event the
Sixth Circuit’s stay was lifted before rescission of the CWR was complete.
After holding a notice and comment period, the EPA and Corps issued a
final rule on February 6, 2018, adding an applicability date of February 6,
2020, to the 2015 CWR.138 The same day the Suspension Rule went into
effect, the manner in which the Suspension Rule was enacted was
immediately challenged in the U.S. District Court of South Carolina by the
Southern Environmental Law Center.139

133. The APA requires the EPA to give general notice of a proposed rule by
publishing it in the Federal Register and providing interested persons the
opportunity to participate through submission of data and arguments. See
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
134. Id. at § 553(c).
135. Definition of “Waters of the United States” - Recodification of PreExisting Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328).
136. Id.
137. Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Addition of an Applicability
Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to
be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
138. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Addition of an Applicability
Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 328).
139. See Conservation Groups Challenge Attack on Clean Water in Federal
Court, SOUTHERN ENVTL. LAW CENTER (Feb. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/YL7D-QT6A.
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On August 16, 2018, a federal judge in South Carolina issued a
nationwide injunction to block the Suspension Rule, making the 2015
CWR applicable in the twenty-six states that have not blocked it.140 The
district court found that the EPA and Corps violated the APA’s rule
making procedures by delaying the 2015 CWR.141 The court held it was
the “agencies’ decision to promulgate the Suspension Rule without
allowing the public to comment on the substance of either the WOTUS
Rule or the 1980’s regulations that rendered the notice-and-comment rule
making infirm under the APA.”142 While the South Carolina decision
seems to signal a win for environmentalist groups, the battle is far from
finished. On the following day, August 17, 2018, the American Farm
Bureau Federation (“AFBF”) and a coalition of businesses notified the
U.S. District Court in South Carolina that they will appeal the court’s
ruling.143 “The AFBF also notified the U.S. District Court in Texas – where
the AFBF filed its original legal challenge to WOTUS – of the South
Carolina ruling, urging the court to issue a nationwide injunction against
the 2015 CWR.”144
If the rescission of the CWR is successful, the EPA and the Corps will
have considerable flexibility to redefine “waters of the United States.” The
Supreme Court’s case law demonstrates that there is no single, stable
interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States.” The lower courts
have been unable to develop a workable interpretation in the eleven years
since the Rapanos decision. The EPA has discretion in choosing how to
construe the CWA based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron v.
NRDC.145
The Chevron analysis is a two-step inquiry for the judicial review of
an agency’s interpretation of a statute.146 The first inquiry asks whether the
statute is ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue.147 The
term “navigable waters” remains ambiguous because the courts have
consistently found non-navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of the
CWA. Furthermore, the term “waters of the United States” is undoubtedly
140. See Emily Moon, A federal Judge Reinstates the Clean Water Rule For
26 States, PACIFIC STANDARD (Aug 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/KQH2-QKZ6.
141. Southern Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, No. 18-CV330-DCN, 2018 WL 3933811, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2018).
142. Id. at *5.
143. Carol Dumas, Farm Bureau Continues Fight to Stop WOTUS
Implementation, CAPITAL PRESS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/5JH2-XDDQ.
144. Id.
145. Larkin, supra note 84.
146. Id.
147. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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ambiguous as applications by the EPA and the courts continue to reach
conflicting interpretations.
The second question examines whether the agency has employed or
embraced a permissible construction of the statute.148 While the first step
determines whether the statute creates a zone of ambiguity; if the statute
creates such an ambiguity, the second step asks whether the agency’s
interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity. If the agency’s
interpretation is permissible, the court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency.149 According to Chevron, “[i]f Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation.”150 Ultimately, if a challenge to the EPA’s “new rule”
redefining WOTUS emerges it is likely that the court would grant
deference to the EPA’s interpretation.
Under Chevron, the EPA’s proposed rule clarifying and interpreting
“waters of the United States” is presumptively valid unless proven
unreasonable. This presumption makes challenging the EPA’s new rule in
court more difficult. The frequent fluctuation of power in the Executive
branch presents a problem with this system because the rule is subject to
rescission and revision every time the Executive branch changes hands. In
addition to the changing political landscape, rulemaking is a long and
cumbersome process that results in a merely temporary fix due to the
possibility of rescission every four years. The EPA closed the notice and
comment period on its proposed rule to rescind the CWR in October
2017.151 As of January 2018, the EPA has not promulgated a final rule to
rescind the CWR, and the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision on
the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the CWR.
V.

PURIFYING THE WATERS
The Legislative, Judicial, and Executive branches all attempted to
define “waters of the United States” without success, each resulting in
more confusion and consequences. Judicial interpretations continue to
split the courts. As a result of the changing presidential administrations,
the Executive branch is engaged in a political gridlock to rescind and
148. Id.
149. Id. at 844.
150. Id. at 843-44.
151. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Extension of Comment Period for the
Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-existing
Rules, https:// perma.cc/45QR-LNN2 (last visited November 12, 2017).
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revise. Unfortunately, this is the position that Congress created by not
providing any clarification despite many years of controversy surrounding
the interpretation of the CWA.
The most permanent solution to remedy the ambiguity is for Congress
to revisit and redefine WOTUS under the CWA through legislative
amendment. A legislative amendment to the CWA is the most permanent
solution for resolving the ambiguity surrounding the WOTUS definition.
The legislative amendment should narrow the scope of the CWA by
restricting the expansive interpretations of “waters of the United States”
to provide more certainty and respect for the rights of landowners.
In making this amendment, the legislature should adopt Justice
Scalia’s standard in Rapanos, effectively narrowing WOTUS “to include
only permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water
forming geographic features that are described in ordinary parlance as
streams, oceans, rivers and lakes.”152 The amendment should further
exclude from the definition any “channels through which waters flow
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage for rainfall.”153 This amendment should effectively return the
term “waters” to its commonsense definition. Finally, the amendment
should expressly state that wetlands are only subject to the jurisdiction of
the CWA when there exists a continuous surface connection to WOTUS.
Adopting Justice Scalia’s interpretation and defining WOTUS under
the CWA will rein in the confusion and constrain the expansive scope of
the CWA. Narrowing the CWA to focus only on “waters” with a
“continuous surface connection” prevents further overreaching regulation
of wetlands. The terms “navigable” and “of the United States” should be
abandoned to restrict the scope only to those water bodies forming
geographic features. A narrow interpretation reduces the Corps’
jurisdiction under the Section 404 permitting process. Curtailing the scope
of the CWA’s jurisdiction eases property owners’ fears of unwarranted
fines, civil or criminal liability, and overregulation of private land.
Passing a legislative amendment is no easy task: Both houses of
Congress have previously attempted to pass legislative amendments
clarifying “waters of the United States” without success.154 The political
influences affecting the EPA’s interpretation are not isolated to the
Executive branch. Getting both houses of Congress to support a single
152. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732.
153. Id.
154. See generally for discussions of the various bills introduced by Congress;
Claudia Copeland, The “Waters of the United States” Rule: Legislative Options
and 114th Congress Responses, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 29,
2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43943.pdf.
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interpretation will be a difficult task. Taking the judicial uncertainty and
Congress’s inaction into consideration, the EPA is currently in the best
position to narrow the scope of WOTUS because of the deference given
to agencies interpreting their own statutes. Arguably, Congress intended
all along to leave it up to the EPA to make the interpretations. While that
may have been the intent when drafting the CWA, the ambiguity has
existed for more than thirty years without a clear resolution. The
temporary nature and political back-and-forth of agency interpretations
necessitates a legislative amendment to correct the ambiguity.
In the alternative, if Congress cannot successfully pass a legislative
amendment to the CWA, the EPA should stay its course and rescind and
replace the CWR. The EPA’s current planned revision involves the
adoption of Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos. This revision would achieve the
narrowing of the WOTUS interpretation. In conducting the rulemaking
process, the EPA needs to tread carefully and follow the APA
requirements on rulemaking to ensure the revised rule is not struck down
on the grounds of being arbitrary and capricious. Of course, this revision
would be temporary because a new administration can always rescind the
rule, but the EPA is still in the best position to quickly clarify the
ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
The definition of “waters of the United States” has long been
ambiguous and attempts to clarify the term have only added to the
confusion. Various problems have arisen surrounding the government’s
regulation of wetlands. Wetlands play an important role in the ecology of
neighboring water bodies, but not all wetlands are within the scope of the
CWA, nor should they be. The history of the EPA’s regulation under the
CWA has shown that the current definition of WOTUS is an unworkable,
ambiguous categorization that has led to problems for courts and private
landowners alike. A clear, workable definition is long overdue. These
expansive agency interpretations must be reined in by narrowing the scope
of waters governed by the CWA.
The EPA can narrow the definition by altering the language to apply
to only those standing or continuously flowing “water” bodies that form
“geographical features.” This revision could come from the EPA through
its rulemaking process. However, the problem with choosing this route is
that it is a long process and subject to rescission whenever political power
shifts.
A better, more permanent solution would be for Congress to revisit the
CWA. An amendment to the CWA that defines “waters of the United

244

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VII

States” by applying the late Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos
would prevent the expansive regulation of non-navigable and non-adjacent
wetlands. A narrow interpretation would provide further clarity and limit
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction under the Section 404 permit process.
A legislative amendment embracing a narrower interpretation would allow
for the protection of the “waters of the United States” from pollutants
while also protecting the property rights over isolated wetlands.
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